Background. Arguably the most influential force in human history is the formation of social coalitions and
Introduction
Coalitions and alliances (i.e., long-lasting coalitions) are often observed in a number of mammals including hyenas, wolves, lions, cheetahs, coatis, meerkats, and dolphins (1) . In primates, both kin and non-kin, and both within-group and group-level coalitions are a very powerful means of achieving increased reproductive success via increased dominance status and access to mates and other resources (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) . In humans, coalitions occurs at many different levels (ranging from within-family to between-nation states) and represent probably the most dominant factor in social interactions that has shaped human history (8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15) .
The evolutionary forces emerging from coalitionary interactions may have been extremely important for the origin of our "uniquely unique" species (16, 17) . For example, it has been argued that the evolution of human brain size and intelligence during Pleistocene was largely driven by selective forces arising from intense competition between individuals for increased social and reproductive success (the "social brain" hypothesis, also known as the "Machiavellian intelligence" hypothesis; (16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27) ). Coalition formation is one of the most powerful strategies in competitive interactions and thus it should have been an important ingredient of selective forces acting in early humans. Moreover, one can view language as a tool that originally emerged for simplifying the formation and improving the efficiency of coalitions and alliances. It has also been argued that the establishment of stable group-wide egalitarian alliances in early human groups should have created conditions promoting the origin of conscience, moralistic aggression, altruism, and other norms favoring the group interests over those of individuals (28) . Increasing within-group cohesion should also promote the group efficiency in between-group conflicts (29, 30) and intensify cultural group selection (31) .
In spite of their importance for biological, social and cultural evolution, our understanding of how coalitions and alliances are formed, maintained and break down is limited. Existing theoretical approaches for studying coalitions in animals are deeply rooted in cooperative game theory, economics, and operations research (32, 33, 34, 35) . These approaches are usually limited by consideration of coalitions of two individuals against one, focus on conditions under which certain coalitions are successful and/or profitable and assume (implicitly or explicitly) that individuals are able to evaluate these conditions and join freely coalitions that maximize their success (36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44) . As such, they typically do not capture the dynamic nature of coalitions and/or are not directly applicable to individuals lacking the abilities to enter into binding agreements and to obtain, process, and use complex information on costs, benefits, and consequences of different actions involving multiple parties (45) . These approaches do not account for the effects of friendship and the memory of past events and acts which all are important in coalition formation and maintenance. Other studies emphasize the importance of Prisoner's Dilemma as a paradigm for the emergence of cooperative behavior in groups engaged in the public goods game (46, 47) . These studies have been highly successful in identifying conditions that favor the evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals in the face of incentives to cheat. Prisoner's Dilemma however is often not appropriate for studying coalitionary behavior (48, 49) especially when individuals cooperate to compete directly with other individuals or coalitions (16, 17) and within-coalition interactions are mutualistic rather than altruistic and the benefit of cooperation is immediate. The social network dynamics that result from coalition formation remain largely unexplored.
Here, we propose a simple and flexible theoretical approach for studying the dynamics of alliance emergence applicable where game-theoretic methods are not practical. Our method is related to recent models of social network formation and games on graphs with dynamic linking (50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55) . In our novel approach, alliances are defined in a natural way (via affinity matrices; see below) and emerge from low-level processes.
The approach is both scalable and expandable. It is scalable in that it can be generalized to larger groups, or groups of groups, and potentially applied to modeling the origin and evolution of states (11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 56, 57) . It is expandable in that it allows for inclusion of additional factors such as behavioral, genetic, social, and cultural features. One particular application of our approach is an analysis of conditions under which intense competition for a limiting resource between individuals with intrinsically different fighting abilities could lead to the emergence of a single leveling alliance including all members of the group. This application is relevant with regard to recent discussions of "egalitarian revolution" (i.e. a rapid transition from a hierarchical society of great apes to an egalitarian society of human hunter-gatherers, (10)), and whether it could have been triggered by an increase in human cognitive abilities (16, 17) .
Model
We consider a group of N individuals continuously engaged in competition for status and/or access to a limited resource. Individuals differ with regard to their fighting abilities s i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ). The attitude of individual i to individual j is described by a variable x ij which we call affinity. We allow for both positive and negative affinities. Individual affinities control the probabilities of getting coalitionary support (see below). The group state is characterized by an N × N matrix with elements x ij which we will call the affinity matrix.
Time is continuous. Below we say that an event occurs at rate r if the probability of this event during a short time interval dt is rdt.
We assume that each individual gets engaged in a conflict with another randomly chosen individual at rate α which we treat as a constant for simplicity. Each other member of the group is aware of the conflict with a constant probability ω. Each individual, say individual k, aware of a conflict between individuals i and j ("initiators"), evaluates a randomly chosen initiator of a conflict, say, individual i, and helps him or not with probabilities h ki and 1 − h ki , respectively. In the latter case, individual k then evaluates the other initiator of the conflict and helps him or not with probabilities h kj and 1 − h kj , respectively. We note that the coalitionary support may be vocal rather than physical (58) . Below we will graphically illustrate the group state using matrices with elements h ij which we will call interference matrices.
The interference probabilities h ij are given by an S-shaped function of affinity x ij and are scaled by two parameters: β and η. A baseline interference rate β controls the probability of interference on behalf of an individual the affinity towards whom is zero; β can be viewed as a measure of individual aggressiveness (i.e., the readiness to interfere in a conflict) or persuasiveness (i.e., the ability to attract help). A slope parameter η controls how rapidly the probability of interference increases with affinity. In numerical simulations we will use function
Note that the probability of help h ij changes from 0 to β to 1 as affinity x ij changes from large negative values to zero to large positive values.
For simplicity, we assume that interference decisions are not affected by who else is interfering and on which side. We also assume that individuals join coalitions without regard to their probability of winning. This assumption is sensible as a first step because predicting the outcomes of conflicts involving multiple participants and changing alliances would be very challenging for apes and hunter-gatherers.
As a result of interference, an initially dyadic conflict may transform into a conflict between two coalitions.
[Here, coalition is a group of individuals on the same side of a particular conflict.] The fighting ability S I of a coalition I with n participants is defined as s n n 2 , where s n is the average fighting ability of the participants. This formulation follows the classical Lanchester-Osipov square law (59, 60, 61) which captures a larger importance of the size of the coalition over the individual strengths of its participants. The probability that coalition I prevails over coalition J is S I /(S I + S J ).
Following a conflict resolution we update the affinities of all parties involved by a process analogous to reinforcement learning (62) . The affinities of winners are changed by δ ww , of the losers by δ ll , the affinities of winners to losers by δ wl , and those of losers to winners by δ lw . The δ-values reflect the effects of the costs and benefits of interference on future actions. It is natural to assume that the affinities of winners increase (δ ww > 0) and those of antagonists decrease (δ wl < 0, δ lw < 0). The change in the affinities of losers δ ll can be of either sign or zero. Parameters δ ww , δ wl , δ lw and δ ll are considered to be constant. We note that a negative impact of costs of interfering in a conflict on the probability of future interferences can be captured by additionally reducing all 
, h clustering coefficients and the average probability of help in an alliance affinities between members of a coalition by a fixed value δ.
We assume that coalitions are formed and conflicts are resolved on a time-scale much faster than that of conflict initiation. Finally, to reflect a reduced importance of past events relative to more recent events in controlling one's affinities, affinities decay towards 0 at a constant rate µ (63). Table 1 summarizes our notaion.
Results and Their Biological Interpretation
To gain intuition about the model's behavior we ran numerical simulations with all affinities initially zero. We analyzed the structure of the interference matrix h ij , looking for emerging alliances. We say individuals i and j are allies if their interference probabilities h ij and h ji both exceed the baseline interference rate β by at least 50%.
An alliance is a connected network of allies.
We also measured a number of statistics including the average and variance of affinities, the proportion of individuals who belong to an alliance, the number and sizes of alliances, the clustering coefficients C (1) and C (2) (64), related to the probability that two allies of an individual are themselves allies. The average interference probability and the clustering coefficients can be interpreted as measuring the "strength" of alliances.
To make interpretation of model dynamics easier, we computed the proportion X i of conflicts won since birth, and the expected social success Y i = k b k /A i , where A i is the age of individual i, the sum is over all conflicts k he has participated in, the benefit b k is 1/n k if i was a member of a winning coalition of n k individuals, and b k is 0 if i was on the losing side. Although in our model the probability of winning always increases with the coalition size, the benefit b k always decreases with the coalition size. The net effect of the alliance size on the expected benefits of its members will depend on the sizes and composition of all alliances in the group. Note that our interpretation of Y i as a measure of expected social success makes sense both if all members on the winning side share equally the reward or if the spoils of each particular conflict goes to a randomly chosen member of the winning coalition. The former may be the case when the reward is an increase in status or rank. The latter may correspond to situations similar to those in baboons fighting over females, where members of the winning coalition may race to the female and whoever reaches her first becomes the undisputed consort for some time (48) . Nonequal sharing of benefits can be incorporated in the model in a straightforward way. Note also that being a member of a losing coalition always reduces relative social success.
We also calculated the standard deviations H X and H Y of X i and Y i values. These statistics measure the degree of "social inequality" in the group. Emergence of alliances. In our model, the affinity between any two individuals is reinforced if they are on a winning side of a conflict and is decreased if they are on the opposite sides; all affinities also decay to zero at a constant rate. The resulting state represents a balance between factors increasing and decreasing affinities.
Although the emergence of alliances is in no way automatic, simulations show that under certain conditions they do emerge. The size, strength, and temporal stability of alliances depend on parameters and may vary dramatically from one run to another even with the same parameters. However, once one or more alliances with high values of C (1) , C (2) and h are formed, they are typically stable. Individuals belonging to the same alliance have very similar social success which is only weakly correlated with their fighting abilities. That is, the social success is now defined not by the individual?s fighting ability but by the size and strength of the alliance he belongs to.
Individuals from different alliances can have vastly different social success, so that the formation of coalitions and alliances does not necessarily reduce social inequality in the group as a whole.
Phase transition. We performed a detailed numerical study of the effects of individual parameters of the properties of the system. As expected, increasing the frequency of interactions (which can be achieved by increasing the group size N , the awareness probability ω, baseline interference rate β, or the slope parameter η) and reducing the affinity decay rate µ all promote alliance formation. Most interestingly, some characteristics change in a phase transition-like pattern as some parameters undergo small changes. For example, Figure 2 show that increasing N, ω, β, η, or decreasing µ result in a sudden transition from no alliances to at least one very strong alliance with all members always supporting each other. Parameter δ ll has a similar but less extreme effect, whereas parameters δ wl and δ lw have relatively weak effects (Supplementary Information). Similar threshold-like behavior is exhibited by the C (2) -measure, the average probability of help h within the largest alliance, the number of alliances, and the numbers of alliances with C for birth/death events, and the cultural inheritance of social networks. New individuals are born at a constant rate γ.
Each birth causes the death of a different randomly chosen individual. We explored two rather different scenarios of cultural inheritance. In the first, the offspring inherits the social network of its parent who is chosen among all individuals with a probability proportional to the rate of social success Y i . This scenario requires special social bonds between parents and offspring. In the second, each new individual inherits affinities of its "role model"
(chosen from the whole group either with a uniform probability or with a probability proportional to the rate of social success Y i ). Under both scenarios, if individual i * is an offspring (biological in the first scenario or cultural in the second scenario) of individual i, then we set x i * j = κx ij for each other individual j in the group (parameter 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1 controls the strength of social network inheritance). In the parent-offspring case, the affinities of other individuals to the son are proportional to those to the father: x ji * = κx ji and x i * i = x ii * is set to κ times the maximum existing affinity in the group. In the role model case, other individuals initially have zero affinities to the new member of the group:
Stochastic equilibrium. If cultural inheritance of social networks is weak (κ is small), a small number of Egalitarian state. If cultural inheritance of social networks is faithful (κ is large), the dynamics become dramatically different due to intense selection between different alliances. Now the turnover of individuals creates conditions for growth of alliances. Larger alliances increase in size as a result of their members winning more conflicts, achieving higher social success, and parenting (biologically or culturally) more offspring who themselves become members of the paternal alliance. As a result of this positive feedback loop (analogous to that of positive frequency-dependent selection), the system exhibits a strong tendency towards approaching a state in which all members of the group belong to the same alliance and have very similar social success in spite of strong variation in their fighting abilities. Figure 4 contrasts the egalitarian state with the stochastic equilibrium illustrated in Figure   3 above. One can see that at the egalitarian state, the average affinity is increased while the standard deviation of affinity and the hierarchy measures are decreased. Although at the egalitarian state the correlation of individual strength and social success can be substantial, it does not result in social inequality. This "egalitarian" state can be reached in several generations.
Cycling. However, the egalitarian state is not always stable. Under certain conditions the system continuously goes through cycles of increased and decreased cohesion (Figure 5a -c) in which the egalitarian state is gradually approached as one alliance eventually excludes all others. But once the egalitarian state is established (in Figure 5d, around time 5200), it quickly disintegrates because of internal conflicts between members of the winning alliance. Figure 5d illustrates one such cycle, showing that the dominant alliance remains relatively stable as long as the group excludes at least one member ("outsider").
Analytical approaches. Simple "mean-field" approximations help to understand model dynamics. These ap- Figure 3 which resulted in a small number of alliances maintained in stochastic equilibrium. The right column of graphs correspond to a run with κ = 1 (complete cultural inheritance of social network) and µ = 0.025 (increased memory of past events) which resulted in an egalitarian regime. With several alliances present simultaneously (left graphs), the average affinity is small, the variance of affinities is large, the measures of social inequality H x and H y are large, and the correlation between social success Y i and individual fighting ability s i is small. In the egalitarian state (right graphs), the average affinity is large, the variance of affinities is small, the measures of social inequality H x and H y are small, and the correlation between social success Y i and individual fighting ability s i is large. proximations focus on the average a and variance v of affinities computed over particular coalitions (Supplemen- Here the mean δ and variance var δ are computed over the four δ-coefficients. Both the approximations and numerical simulations suggest that the egalitarian state cannot be stable with negative δ. Increasing the population size N , awareness ω, average δ, and decreasing the affinity decay rate µ and variance var δ all promote stability of the 
Discussion
The overall goal of this paper was to develop a flexible theoretical framework for describing the emergence of alliances of individuals able to overcome the power of alpha-types in a population and to study the dynamics and consequences of these processes. We considered a group of individuals competing for rank and/or some limiting resource (e.g., mates). We assumed that individuals varied strongly in their fighting abilities. If all conflicts were exclusively dyadic, a hierarchy would emerge with a few strongest individuals getting most of the resource (67, 68, 69, 70) . However there is also a tendency (very small initially) for individuals to interfere in an ongoing dyadic conflict thus biasing its outcome one way or another. Positive outcomes of such interferences increase the affinities between individuals while negative outcomes decrease them. Using a minimum set of assumptions about cognitive abilities of individuals, we looked for conditions under which long-lasting coalitions (i.e. alliances) emerge in the group. We showed that such an outcome is promoted by increasing the frequency of interactions (which can be achieved in a number of ways) and decreasing the affinity decay rate. Most interestingly, the model shows that the shift from a state with no alliances to one or more alliances typically occurs in a phase-transition like fashion. Even more surprisingly, under certain conditions (that include some cultural inheritance of social networks) a single alliance comprising all members of the group can emerge in which the resource is divided evenly. That is, the competition among nonequal individuals can paradoxically result in their eventual equality.
We emphasize that in our model, egalitarianism emerges from political dynamics of intense competition between individuals for higher social and reproductive success rather than by environmental constraints, social structure, or cultural processes. In other words, within-group conflicts promote the buildup of a group-level alliance. In a sense, once alliances start to form, there is no other reasonable strategy but to join one, and once social networks become highly heritable, a single alliance including all group members is destined to emerge.
Few clarifications are in order. First, in our model coalitionary interactions are mutualistic in nature rather than altruistic. We note that there are not many examples of truly altruistic behavior outside of humans (45) with some of those that were initially suggested to be altruistic under closer examination turning out to be kin-directed or mutualistic (45, 71) . Even in humans certain behaviors that are viewed as altruistic may have a rather different origin. For example, food sharing may have originated as a way to avoid harassment, e.g. in the form of begging (45) . In any case, modern human behavior is strongly shaped by evolved culture (31) and might not be a good indicator of factors acting during its origin. Second, in our model we avoided the crucial step of the dominant game-theoretic paradigm which is an explicit evaluation of costs and benefits of certain actions in controlling one's decisions. In our model, coalitions and alliances emerge from simple processes based on individuals using only limited "local" information (i.e., information on own affinities but not on other individuals' affinities) rather than as a solution to an optimization task. Our approach is justified not only by its mathematical simplicity but by biological realism as well. Indeed, solving the cost-benefit optimization tasks (which require rather sophisticated algebra in modern game-theoretic models) would be very difficult for apes and early humans (45) especially given the multiplicity of behavioral choices and the dynamic nature of coalitions. Therefore treating coalitions and alliances in early human groups as an emergent property rather than an optimization task solution appears to be a much more realistic approach. We note that costs and benefits can be incorporated in our approach in a straightforward manner. Third, one should be careful in applying our model to contemporary humans (whether members of modern societies or hunter-gathers). In contemporary humans, an individual's decision on joining coalitions will be strongly affected by his/her estimates of costs, benefits, and risks associated as well as by cultural beliefs and traditions. These are the factors explicitly left outside of our framework.
Our results have implications for a number of questions related to human social evolution. The great apes' societies are very hierarchical; their social system is based on sharp status rivalry and depends on specific dispositions for dominance and submission. A major function of coalitions in apes is to maintain or change the dominance structure (1, 3); although leveling coalitions are sometimes observed (e.g., (2)), they are typically of small size and short-lived. In sharp contrast, most known hunter-gatherer societies are egalitarian (8, 9, 10) . Their weak leaders merely assist a consensus-seeking process when the group needs to make decisions; at the band level, all main political actors behave as equal. It has been argued that in egalitarian societies the pyramid of power is turned upside down with potential subordinates being able to express dominance because they find collective security in a large, group-wide political coalition (10) . One factor that may have promoted transition to an egalitarian society is the development of larger brains and better political/social intelligence in response to intense within-group competition for increased social and reproductive success (16, 17, 25, 27) . Our model supports these arguments.
Indeed, increased cognitive abilities would allow humans to maintain larger group sizes, have higher awareness of ongoing conflicts, better abilities in attracting allies and building complex coalitions, and better memories of past events. The changes in each of these characteristics may have shifted the group across the phase boundary to the regime where the emergence of an egalitarian state becomes unavoidable. Similar effect would follow a change in mating system that would increase father-son social bonds, or an increase in fidelity of cultural inheritance of social networks. The fact that mother-daughter social bonds are often very strong suggests (everything else being the same) females could more easily achieve egalitarian societies. The establishment of a stable group-wide egalitarian alliance should create conditions promoting the origin of conscience, moralistic aggression, altruism, and other cultural norms favoring the group interests over those of individuals (28) . Increasing within-group cohesion will also promote the group efficiency in between-group conflicts (29) and intensify cultural group selection.
In humans, a secondary transition from egalitarian societies to hierarchical states took place as the first civilizations were emerging. How can it be understood in terms of the model presented here? One can speculate that technological and cultural advances made the coalition size much less important in controlling the outcome of a conflict than the individuals' ability to directly control and use resources (e.g., weapons, information, food) that strongly influence conflict outcomes. In terms of our model, this would dramatically increase the variation in individual fighting abilities and simultaneously render the Lanchester-Osipov square law inapplicable, making egalitarianism unstable.
Besides developing a novel and general approach for modeling coalitionary interactions and providing theoretical support to some controversial verbal arguments concerning social transitions during the origin of humans, the research presented here allows one to make a number of testable predictions. In particular, our model has identified a number of factors (such as group size, the extent to which group members are aware of within-group conflicts, cognitive abilities, aggressiveness, persuasiveness, existence of outsiders, and the strength of parent-offspring social bonds) which are predicted to increase the likelihood and size of alliances and affect in specific ways individual social success and the degree of within-group inequality. Existing data on coalitions in mammals (in particular, in dolphins and primates) and in human hunter-gatherer societies should be useful in testing these predictions and in refining our model.
Supporting Information
Here, we present
• some additional details on the computational methods used;
• a set of figures ( Figures S1-S8 ) illustrating the effects of individual parameters on the coalitionary structure of the model achieved within a single generation;
• a set of figures ( Figures S9 and S10 ) illustrating the effects of changes in multiple parameters simultaneously on the coalitionary structure of the model achieved within a single generation;
• an outline of a mathematical method used to study the model analytically.
Some details of computational methods
Probabilities of help For an individual k aware of a conflict between individuals i and j, the probabilities of helping to i, to j, and of no interference are set to
respectively. In numerical simulations, we set
, where β and η are scaling parameters. Note that h ki → 1 for x ki → ∞, h ki → 0 for x ki → −∞, and h ki = β for
Numerical implementation
The model dynamics were simulated using Gillespie's direct method (Gillespie 1977) . That is, the next event to happen is chosen according to the corresponding rates. The time interval until the next event is drawn from an exponential distribution with a parameter equal to the sum of the rates of all possible events. All rates are recomputed after each event. 
Supplementary Methods: Mean field approximation for the dynamics of coalitions on the within-generation time-scale
We consider a group of N individuals in which conflicts occur at rate αN . Below we will use two types of averages: the average over a clique (i.e., a set of individuals who all are close allies), which we will denote as ξ , and the average over all possible outcomes of the process, which we will denote as ξ or E(ξ), where ξ is a random variable.
Approximate dynamics of the mean and variance of affinities near an egalitarian state. We assume that all N individuals are close allies so that each individual aware of a conflict interferes in it. The average affinity of the group is
After each conflict, each affinity value changes from x ij to x ij + ε ij where ε ij is a random variable describing the change in affinity of individual i to individual j. Let a = x be the expected average affinity. Since expectation and averaging are linear, the expected average affinity after a conflict can be written as
All affinities continuously decay to 0 at a constant rate µ. Therefore, the dynamics of a are described by a differ-
Similarly, let v = x 2 − x 2 be the expectation of the variance taken over all possible outcomes of the process. Then the variance after a conflict is
where, as an approximation, we assumed that x and ε are independent with respect to the averaging operator, i.e.,
x ε = x ε .
All squares of affinities decay to 0 at a constant rate 2µ. Therefore, the dynamics of v are described by a differential equation
First, we consider the expected change ε in the affinity of a random pair of individuals after a conflict. There are three possibilities:
• With probability 1/ N 2 , the two individuals are the initiators of the conflict. Since either of the two initiators can be on the winning side, the expected change in their affinity is
Under our assumptions about the meaning of parameters, δ 0 is negative.
• With probability 2(N − 2)/ N 2 ω, one of the two individuals is an "initiator" while the other was aware of the conflict and interfered on behalf of one side. Since there are four ways to distribute the two individuals over the winning and losing coalitions and each occurs with equal probability, the expected change in their affinity is
• With probability 1 − 1/ Therefore,
Then, equations (S1,S3b) predict that the average affinity in the egalitarian state evolves to an equilibrium value
The average affinity is positive only if δ > 0. The last term in the brackets can be neglected relative to the first term even for small groups (e.g., N ≥ 5). The second term in the brackets can be neglected for larger groups (e.g.,
In a similar way and using the results above,
where
More involved calculations show that
The term A 1 can be interpreted as the expected value of ∆ = ε ij ε ij + ε ij ε ji for a random pair of individuals (i and j). There are three cases to consider.
• With probability 1/ N 2 , the focal individuals are the initiators of the conflict. In this case, ∆ = 2δ 2 0 .
• With probability 2(N − 2)/ N 2 ω, one of the two focal individuals is the initiator of the conflict while the other is aware of it.
The term A 2 can be interpreted as the expected value of ∆ = ε ij ε ik + ε ij ε kj + ε ij ε jk + ε ij ε ki for a random triple of individuals (i, j and k). There are three cases to consider.
• With probability 3/ N 2 ω, two of the three focal individuals are the initiators of the conflict while the third is aware of it. In this case, ∆ = (8δ o δ + 4δ 2 )/3.
Therefore,
The term A 3 can be interpreted as the expected value of ∆ = ε ij ε kl for a random quartet of individuals (i, j, k and l). There are three cases to consider:
• With probability 6/ • With probability 4(N − 4)/ N 2 ω 3 , one of the four focal individuals is the initiator of the conflict while the three others are aware of it. In this case, ∆ = δ 2 .
• With probability 1 − 4(N − 4)/ 
Keeping only the leading terms in 1/N , ε 2 ij = ω 2 δ 2 , ε ij ε kl = (ω 2 δ) 2 , which results in an equation for v:
where var δ = δ 2 − δ 2 . Higher order corrections (in 1/N ) can be found in a straightforward way from the formula given above.
Keeping only the leading terms in 1/N , the mean field approximation predicts the following equilibrium values at the egalitarian regime The strongest clique comprising N 1 individuals; other N 2 = N − N 1 individuals belong to weaker cliques. We assume that all N 1 individuals in the clique are close allies that always help each other and never help outsiders. To evaluate the expected average over the clique ε , we need to find the expected value of ∆ = ε ij for a random pair from the strongest clique. One needs to consider five possibilities:
• With probability 1/ N 2 , the focal individuals are the initiators of the conflict. In this case, ∆ = δ 0 .
• With probability 2(N 1 − 2)ω/ N 2 , one of the focal individuals is an initiator of a conflict involving another member of the clique while the other is aware of the conflict and interferes on behalf of one side. In this case, ∆ = δ.
• With probability • With probability 2N 2 / N 2 ω, one of the focal individuals is an initiator of a conflict involving an outsider while the other is aware of the conflict and interferes on behalf of the clique member. Assuming that the clique always wins, ∆ = δ W W .
• With probability (N 1 − 2)N 2 / N 2 ω 2 , both focal individuals are aware of and interfere in a conflict between a member of the clique and an outsider. Assuming that the clique always wins, ∆ = δ W W .
Assume that N 1 = N − 1, N 2 = 1 (i.e., the single outsider case). Then the dynamics of the average within-clique Keeping only terms of order O(1/N ) and larger in the brackets,
It is illuminating to compare this expression with expression (S4) approximating the average affinity under egalitarian regime. Under the same assumptions, expression (S4) simplifies to
If N is not too large, a * can be substantially smaller than a * s . It is in this situation when a single outsider can have a strong stabilizing effect on a small coalition. For example, let α = 1, N = 20, ω = 0.5, µ = 0.05 and δ W W = 1, δ LL = 0.5, δ LW = −0.5, δ W L = −0.5 so that δ = 0.125. Then a * = 15.00 but a * s = 23.75, so that a single outsider significantly increases the average affinity of the clique. A single outsider will also reduce variance v, the effect of which will further strengthen the stability of the coalition.
